New Legal Effects Resulting from the Failure of States to Fulfill Obligations Under European Community Law: The Francovich Judgement by Lang, John Temple
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 16, Issue 1 1992 Article 1
New Legal Effects Resulting from the Failure
of States to Fulfill Obligations Under
European Community Law: The Francovich
Judgement
John Temple Lang∗
∗
Copyright c©1992 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
New Legal Effects Resulting from the Failure
of States to Fulfill Obligations Under
European Community Law: The Francovich
Judgement
John Temple Lang
Abstract
This Article examines a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Communities that
is likely both to ensure much greater protection for the rights of citizens and companies in the
European Community, and to bring about a higher level of compliance with Community law by
EC Member States. In brief, the Court ruled that in certain circumstances a Member State is liable
to pay compensation to private parties if it has failed to implement a directive. To see how the
Court of Justice reached this conclusion, and to assess the judgment’s importance, it is necessary
to summarize previous case law, to explain how this case arose, and to discuss the judgment and
its implications
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INTRODUCTION
In November 1991, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities ("Court" or "Court ofJustice") rendered a deci-
sion that is likely both to ensure much greater protection for
the rights of citizens and companies in the European Commu-
nity ("EC" or "Community"),' and to bring about a higher
level of compliance with Community law by EC Member
States.2 In brief, the Court ruled that in certain circumstances
a Member State is liable to pay compensation to private parties
if it has failed to implement a directive.' To see how the Court
ofJustice reached this conclusion, and to assess the judgment's
importance, it is necessary to summarize previous case law, to
explain how this case arose, and to discuss the judgment and
its implications.
I. BACKGROUND: APPLICABLE RULES AND CASE LAW
The plaintiffs in Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italy4 (Francovich)
argued that Italy was liable for failing to implement a direc-
tive.5 The EC Council adopted Directive 80/987 in 1980 (the
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty].
2. Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19,
1991) (not yet reported) [hereinafter Francovich].
3. Id., slip op. T 48. In general, a directive is a binding EC measure that is in-
tended to be carried out by whatever national measures the Member States consider
appropriate. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189. Specifically, Article 189 states that
"[a] directive shall bind any Member State to which [it is] addressed, as to the result
to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and
means." Id.
4. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported).
5. Id., slip op. 5-6.
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"Directive"). 6 The Directive was intended to benefit the em-
ployees of a company that becomes insolvent, in particular to
ensure that arrears of pay are ultimately satisfied.7 In February
1989, the Court ruled that Italy had failed to fulfill its obliga-
tion to implement the Directive. 8
Francovich and others later sued the Italian State because
they had been unable to recover arrears of pay due to them.9
They first argued that the Directive required the establishment
of a guarantee fund, possibly State-financed.'" They argued,
therefore, that the State should be treated as having rejected
the option for a privately financed fund, and as having implic-
itly decided to set up a State-financed fund."t If this argument
had been accepted, the State would have been liable in accord-
ance with the Directive. The Court rejected this argument for
reasons which are not relevant in this Article. 12
The second important issue arose as to whether the plain-
tiffs could sue the Italian State for compensation for its failure
to implement the Directive.' 3 In order to address this issue,
certain established rules of Community law need to be recal-
led.
A. The Rules Already Established
Some Community law rules are "directly applicable" be-
cause they bind all who come within their terms without the
need for any national implementing measures.' 4 National
courts must apply these rules.' 5 Other Community law rules,
such as directives, are not directly applicable; they must be im-
plemented by national measures. 16 Such national measures
can be legislative, executive, or administrative, provided that
6. o.J. L 283/23 (1980).
7. Id.
8. Commission v. Italy, Case 22/87, [1989] E.C.R. 143.
9. Francovich, slip op. 5-6.
10. Id. 23-25.
11. Id.
12. Id. 25-26.
13. Id. 7, 9.
14. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189; see, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 39/72,
[1973] E.C.R. 101, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439 [hereinafter Slaughtered Cows].
15. See, e.g., Slaughtered Cows, [1973] E.C.R. 101, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439.
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189; see, e.g., Becker v. Finanzamt MiInster-
Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499 [hereinafter Becker].
1992-19931
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they bring about the appropriate result.' 7 In general, there-
fore, national courts apply the national measures, which give
effect to the directives, rather than the directives themselves,
which bind only the Member State. However, directives have
some "direct effects," that is, legal effects that national courts
must recognize irrespective of whether or how the directives
have been implemented.
Before the Francovich judgment, the case law of the Court
established several principles. First, the Court of Justice has
repeatedly stated that directives have direct effects in national
courts in the sense that they can be relied upon against the
state or state bodies (the criteria for which are set out in Foster
v. British Gas plc 18) irrespective of whether the directive has
been implemented. 9 The relevant provision of the directive
must be clear and unconditional, and it must define rights that
individuals may assert against the Member State at issue."
This is because a state, including its national courts, cannot be
allowed to rely on its own failure to implement a directive in
order to take a legal position that it could not take if the direc-
tive had been properly implemented.2 ' In other words, in liti-
gation against the state, a private party may rely on the direc-
tive as if it had been properly implemented.22
This first principle is important because it shows that in
some kinds of litigation against the state, the citizen has limited
17. See John Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 645, 647 (1990). I have previously stated that "Article 5 im-
poses a positive obligation on Member States to take all measures, legislative, admin-
istrative and judicial, which are necessary to give full effect to Community law." Id.
18. Foster v. British Gas plc, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. 3313, [1990] 2
C.M.L.R. 833, 840-41, aft'd, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 217 [hereinafter Foster]; see Johnston
v. Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, [1986] 3 C.'M.L.R.
240.
19. Becker, [1982] E.C.R. at 71, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 512-13; Pubblico Ministero
v. Ratti, Case 148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629, 1642, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 96, 110; Van
Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, 1348, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1,
15-16. The Court in Becker stated that "a Member State which has not adopted the
implementing measures required by the directive within the prescribed period may
not plead, as against individuals, its own failure to perform the obligations which the
directive entails." [1982] E.C.R. at 71, [1982] C.M.L.R. at 512.
20. Becker, [1982] E.C.R. at 71, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 512-13.
21. Id.
22. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth.,
Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, 747-50, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688, 700 [hereinafter
Marshall].
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rights under a directive whether or not it has been imple-
mented.23 In practice, these cases are usually either (1) pro-
ceedings brought by the state against a private party in which
the latter used the directive as a defense, or (2) proceedings in
which individuals claimed the right to equal treatment from
state bodies.2 4 The second kind of situation, wherein women
claimed the right to equal treatment from state bodies, gave
rise to the Foster case.25 In litigation between private parties, a
directive or other non-directly applicable rule of Community
law cannot be relied on unless it has been implemented.26 An
exception may lie in some rare cases where the state, although
not formally a party to the proceeding, is really the interested
party.27
Second, the Court repeatedly has stated that, under Arti-
cle 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity ("EEC Treaty"),2 8 national courts must, as far as possi-
ble, interpret national measures intended to implement a di-
rective in such a way as to be compatible with and to carry out
all the terms of the directive.29 This interpretation should be
given even if it would not otherwise be the normal interpreta-
23. Id. at 748-49, [19861 1 C.M.L.R. at 710-11; Becker, [1982] E.C.R. at 71,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 521.
24. See, e.g., Harz v. Deutsche Tradax GmbH, Case 79/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1921,
1942-43, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 453-54 (discussing implementation requirements of
Directive 76/207 for equal treatment of women and men); von Colson v. Land
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, 1906-09, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R.
430, 451-53 (same).
25. See Foster, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. 3313, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833, aff'd,
[1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
26. Marleasing SA v. Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, Case C-106/
89, [1990] E.C.R. 4135, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305; Marshall, [1986] E.C.R. at 749,
[1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711.
27. See John Temple Lang, The Duties of National Courts Under the Constitu-
tional Law of the European Community, Lasok Lecture at Exeter (1987).
28. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art 5. Article 5 provides that
Member States shall take all general or particular measures which are appro-
priate for ensuring the carrying out of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from the-acts of the institutions of the Community. They
shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's aims.
They shall abstain from any measures likely to jeopardise the attain-
ment of the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
29. Commission v. Netherlands, Case 96/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1791, 1803-05,
[1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 7940, 7949; Openbaar
Ministerie v. Bout, Case 21/81, [1982] E.C.R. 381, 389, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 371, 380;
Procureur de la R6publique & Comit6 National de Defense contre l'Alcoolisme v.
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tion of the national measures in question, and regardless of
whether the national measures were enacted before or after
the adoption of the directive. 0
The third principle established by the Court's case law
before Francovich requires that national courts must provide all
appropriate remedies under national law to protect rights
given by directly applicable rules of Community law.3' The
machinery for protecting rights given by Community law is the
national legal machinery. However, the available procedures
must not make it impossible to exercise the Community law
rights.32 The procedures must also be no less favorable than
those protecting corresponding rights under national law.33
This principle was most often applied in cases in which taxpay-
ers claimed repayments of taxes which were contrary to Com-
munity rules because they were protectionist, that is, taxes
were imposed at higher rates on imported goods than on do-
mestic goods.3 4  However, the principle was not confined to
Waterkeyn, Joined Cases 314-16/81 & 83/82, [1982] E.C.R. 4337, 4360-61, [1983] 2
C.M.L.R. 145, 164 [hereinafter Waterkeyn].
30. Marleasing, [1990] E.C.R. 4135, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305; Officier van Justitie
v. Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, Case 80/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3969, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 18;
Harz v. Deutsche Tradax GmbH, Case 79/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1921, 1942-43, [1986] 2
C.M.L.R. 430, 453-54; von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 1891, 1906-09, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 453.
31. Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fuir das Saarland, Case
33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997-98, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 550 [hereinafter Rewe];
see Commission v. Italy, Case 48/71, [1972] E.C.R. 527, 532, [1972] C.M.L.R. 699,
708. The Court stated that
Community law, declared as resjudicata in respect of the Italian Republic, is
a prohibition having the full force of law on the competent national authori-
ties against applying a national rule recognized as incompatible with the
Treaty and, if the circumstances so require, an obligation on them to take all
appropriate measures to enable Community law to be fully applied.
Id at 532, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 708.
32. Rewe, [1976] E.C.R. at 1997-99, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 550. The domestic
legal system must establish courts having jurisdiction in addition to the procedures
necessary in the protection of these rights. Id.
33. Id.; see Amministrazione delle Finanze Olello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A.,
Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263; Costa v. ENEL (Ente Na-
zionale Energia Elettrica), Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425.
34. See, e.g., Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio SpA, Case
199/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3595, 3612, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 658, 690 [hereinafter San
Giorgio]; Rewe, [1976] E.C.R. at 1997-98, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 534; Comet BV v.
Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043, [1977] 1
C.M.L.R. 533.
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tax refund cases. 5
B. The Factortame Decision
A fourth principle can be explained by reference to the
judgment in Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte:
Factortame Ltd. (Factortame). 6 In Factortame, the Commission of
the European Communities ("Commission") challenged the
compatibility of certain United Kingdom ("UK") fisheries
measures with Community law.3 7 The Commission applied to
the Court and asked for interim measures ordering the suspen-
sion of the UK legislation. 38 The Court granted the interim
measures requested.39 Concurrently, the UK courts had been
asked provisionally to suspend the application of the UK meas-
ures.40 There was no precedent in UK domestic law for sus-
pending the operation of an Act of Parliament as an interlocu-
35. See, e.g., San Giorgio, [1983] E.C.R. at 3612, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. at 688; H.
Ferwerda B.V. v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case 265/78, [1980] E.C.R. 617,
629, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 737, 751; Express Dairy Foods Ltd. v. Intervention Board for
Agricultural Produce, Case 130/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1887, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 451; Am-
ministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit Italian S.r.l., Case 61/79, [1980]
E.C.R. 1205, 1226, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 694, 710; Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato v. Ariete S.p.A., Case 811/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2545, 2554, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R.
316, 322; Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. S.a.s. Mediterranea Importa-
zione, Rappresentanze, Esportazione, Commercio (MIRECO), Case 826/79, [1980]
E.C.R. 2559, 2574; Lippische Hauptgenossenschaft e.G. & Westfiilische Central-Ge-
nossenschaft e.G. v. Bundesanstalt f'ir landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Joined
Cases 119 & 126/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1863, 1878-79; Pigs & Bacon Comm'n v. McCar-
ren, Case 177/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2161, 2192, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 389, 427; Rewe,
[1976] E.C.R. at 1997-98, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 550; Comet, [1976] E.C.R. at 2051,
[1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 552; Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Commission v. Italy,
Case 104/86, [1988] E.C.R. 1799, 1809, [19891 3 C.M.L.R. 25, 28; Opinion of Advo-
cate General Reischl, Hans Just I/S v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, Case 68/79,
[1980] E.C.R. 501, 522-23, 531, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 714, 733; Opinion of Advocate
General Warner, lannelli & Volpi S.p.A. v. Meroni, Case 74/76, [1977] E.C.R. 557,
592, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 688, 712. The opinion of Advocate General Reischl is partic-
ularly clear in Russo v. Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi sul Mercato Agricolo
(AIMA), Case 60/75, [1976] E.C.R. 45, 62-63, as is the Court's opinion in Humblet v.
Belgium, Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 559, 569, that applies Article 86 of the ECSC
Treaty to oblige Member States "to make reparation" when a legislative or adminis-
trative measure adopted by the authorities of said state is contrary to Community law.
36. Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, 2473-74, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 29 [here-
inafter Factortame]; cf. Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH v. Hauptzollamt Kiel,
Case 158/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1805, 1838, which should now be regarded as overruled.
37. Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. at 2467, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 25.
38. Id. at 2469, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 26.
39. Id. at 2475, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 30.
40. Id. at 2470, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 27 (citing Commission v. United Kingdom
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tory measure (or indeed otherwise) and the UK measures had
not then been definitely held to be incompatible with Commu-
nity law.4 The UK courts considered whether to continue to
apply the UK measures.42 However, the European Court of
Justice stated that Community law may require national courts
to suspend the operation of national legislation which appears
contrary to Community law, even if, under national law, the
national court has no power to suspend the operation of legis-
lation.4 3 The Court of Justice stated that
it is for national courts in application of the principle of co-
operation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, to en-
sure the legal protection which persons derive from the di-
rect effect of provisions of Community law.., any provision
of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative
or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of
Community law by withholding from the national court hav-
ing jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do every-
thing necessary at the moment of its application to set aside
national legislative provisions which might prevent, even
temporarily, Community rules from having full force and ef-
fect are incompatible with those requirements which are the
very essence of Community law.44
The Court added that the full effectiveness of Community law
also would be impaired if a national law rule prevented grants
of interim relief to ensure the effectiveness of the final judg-
ment.45 The effectiveness of the system by which national
courts refer questions to the Court of Justice under Article 177
of the EEC Treaty46 would be impaired if they could not sus-
pend national legislation while the Court of Justice dealt with
the questions.4 7
The opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Factortame is
clear and important.4" Directly applicable Community rules
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Case 246/89 R, [1989] E.C.R. 3125, [1991] 3
C.M.L.R. 706).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2473, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 29.
45. Id.
46. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
47. See Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. at 2473, [19901 3 C.M.L.R. at 29.
48. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Factortame, id. at 2450-65, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. at 5-25.
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immediately confer upon individuals enforceable legal rights
which may be relied upon before national courts.49 The issue
in Factortame concerned the extent to which these rights enti-
tled the individuals involved to ask for interim measures, based
on Article 5 of the EEC Treaty.5 ° If the means provided by
national law fail to give "complete and effective" protection
for the Community law right, the national court must protect it
"of its own motion."'5t After some general remarks about in-
terlocutory or interim relief, Advocate General Tesauro con-
cluded that "the need to have recourse to legal proceedings to enforce a
right should not occasion damage, to the party in the right . . . the
purpose of interim protection is to achieve.., the effectiveness
of judicial protection. ' 52 As a national court must finally give
precedence to Community law in case of conflict, it must also
be able, when the necessary preconditions are satisfied, to give
interim protection.53 A national law which makes it impossible
in practice to give effective judicial protection for a right given
by Community law must not be applied. 54 The national court's
duty to afford effective judicial protection of rights conferred
on the individual by Community law, where the relevant re-
quirements are satisfied, cannot fail to include the provision of
interim measures for the rights claimed, pending a final deter-
mination.
It is therefore clear, even before Francovich, that the Court
has stated that Community law gives rights which must be pro-
tected effectively by national courts, even if national law does
not itself protect these rights.5 5 Although substantive and pro-
cedural rules apply to the proceedings to enforce these rights,
they must not prevent the right from being effectively pro-
tected. Obviously, there is scope for controversy over the ex-
tent of the rights guaranteed by Community law and the extent
to which national rules can limit the scope of such rights. The
Court has ruled repeatedly that national authorities have a
49. Id. at 2454, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 10.
50. Id., [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 11; see EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
51. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. at 2454-55,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 11.
52. Id. at 2456-57, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 14.
53. Id. at 2465, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 25.
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (explaining "directly applica-
ble" Community laws).
1992-1993]
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duty to enforce Community rules, and must do so effectively
and with as much vigilance as they apply to the corresponding
rules of national law.5 6
II. ANALYSIS OF THE FRANCOVICH DECISION
A. The Conclusions of Advocate General Mischo
1. On the Question of Principle
Advocate General Mischo, like the Court, rejected the ar-
gument based on the directive itself. This point need not be
discussed at present. As his analysis of the case law was very
detailed, he summarized the results of his analysis:
1. Although, in the present state of Community law, it is in
principle each Member State's legal system which deter-
mines the legal procedure which allows the full effect of
Community law to be achieved, this national power is
limited by the obligation of Member States, which re-
sults from Community law, to guarantee that full effect.
2. This applies not only to the rules of Community law
which have direct effect, but to all rules which confer
rights on individuals and companies. The absence of
direct effect does not mean that the objective of Com-
munity law is not to confer rights on individuals and
companies, but means only that the rules are not suffi-
ciently precise and unconditional.
3. When a directive has not been transposed into national
law, or has been incorrectly transposed, a Member State
deprives Community law of the effect which is required.
It commits a violation of Article 5 and Article 189(3) of
the Treaty which lay down the binding nature of direc-
tives and oblige member states to take all measures nec-
essary to carry them out.
4. When the Court, in a judgment on the basis of Articles
169-171 of the Treaty, has found that there has been a
56. Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Germany, Joined Cases 205-15/82, [1983]
E.C.R. 2633, 2665-66, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 586, 612; Fromme v. Bundesanstalt ftir
landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Case 54/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1449, 1463-64; BayWa
AG v. Bundesanstalt fhr landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Joined Cases 146, 192 &
193/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1503, 1533; Commission v. Germany, Case 94/87, [1989]
E.C.R. 175, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 425; Commission v. Germany, Case C-217/88, [1990]
E.C.R. 2879, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.; Amministrazione delle Finanze S.r.I. v. Meridion-
ale Industria Salumi, Fratelli Vasanelli & Fratelli Ultrocchi, Joined Cases 66, 127 &
128/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1237, 1270-72, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 11-13.
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breach of this obligation, the principle of res judicata
and Article 171 oblige the Member State to take all the
measures appropriate to eliminate its breach and to re-
store the result required by Community law, without
being able to rely on any obstacle of any kind to doing
this. On this basis the state can also be obliged to pay
compensation for the loss it has caused to individuals
and companies by its unlawful behavior.
5. On the basis of Community law, the liability of Member
States arises at least when the conditions are fulfilled
for the liability of the Community for breach of Com-
munity law by one of the Community institutions. In
the case of a directive which should have been imple-
mented by a legislative measure, it is enough that the
relevant provisions of the directive are intended to pro-
tect the interests of individuals and companies. The re-
quirement that there must be a sufficiently clear breach
of a higher rule of law should be regarded as to be ful-
filled when the Court has made a finding of a breach by
the state in a judgment based on Articles 169-171.
6. In the present state of Community law, a claim for com-
pensation before a national judge against a Member
State is governed by the national law rules as far as
other aspects are concerned, in particular the assess-
ment of the loss suffered and procedural questions.
This is however subject to two principles: the national
rules must not be less favorable than those concerning
similar claims based on national law, and they must not
be applied in such a way as to make it practically impos-
sible to obtain compensation for the loss suffered. This
means at the minimum that the most complete legal
means in the national legal system should be applied in
such a way as to fulfill these requirements, and even
that an appropriate legal method should be created if it
does not exist.
7. A claim for compensation is different in nature from a
claim for payment based on the provisions of a directive
which has direct effect. This does not mean that a
roundabout means is being used to achieve the same
result as if the provisions of the directive had direct ef-
fect. The loss can be assessed by the national judge "ex
aequo et bono. " He can use the provisions of the direc-
tive, however, as a point of reference.
8. In the light of the uncertainty which has existed until
1992-19931
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now about the liability of Member States to pay com-
pensation for breach of Community law, and of the fi-
nancial consequences which the Court's judgment
could cause as a result of breaches which have occurred
in the past, the effects of the Court's judgment should
be limited in time (i.e. should apply only for the fu-
ture) .57
57. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90,
33 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported) (unofficial English translation).
The Advocate General's opinion, in its original French, reads as follows:
33. Etant donn6 Ia. longeur des d~veloppements qu'il est n6cessaire de
consacrer aux multiples aspects que comporte ce problme, je vous
pr~sente d'abord, dans une premiere partie, un r~sum6 des conclusions aux-
quelles je suis parvenu, et ensuite, dans une deuxiime partie, le dtail de
raisonnement suivi, qui est fond6 pour l'essentiel sur votre jurisprudence.
A. Rsumi
1. Si, en l'6tat actuel de droit communautaire, il appartient en principe A
I'ordre juridique de chaque Etat membre de dterminer le proc~d6
juridique permettant d'atteindre Ia pleine efficacit6 du droit com-
munautaire, cette comptence 6tatique trouve toutefois une limitation
certaine dans I'obligation mrme des Etats membres, d~coulant du droit
communautaire, d'assurer cette efficacit6.
2. Ceci ne vaut pas seulement pour les dispositions de droit com-
munautaire qui ont un effet direct, mais pour toutes les dispositions qui ont
pour but de conf~rer des droits aux particuliers. L'absence d'effet direct, en
effet, ne signifie pas que l'effet recherch6 par le droit communautaire n'est
pas de confrer des droits aux particuliers, mais seulement que ceux-ci ne
sont pas suffisamment precis et inconditionnels pour pouvoir ktre invoqu~s
et appliques tels quels.
3. En cas de non-transposition ou de transposition incorrecte d'une direc-
tive, un Etat membre prive le droit communautaire de l'effet voulu. II corn-
met en mrme temps une infraction aux articles 5 et 189, alin~a 3, du trait6,
qui aflirment le caract~re obligatoire de la directive et l'obligent prendre
toutes les mesures ncessaires son execution.
4. Au cas oci la violation de cette obligation est constat~e dans un arrt de
Ia Cour rendu au titre des articles 169 A 171 du trait6, l'autorit6 de Ia chose
jug~e ainsi que I'article 171 du trait6 imposent A l'Etat membre du prendre,
sans pouvoir opposer aucun obstacle de quelque nature qu'il soit, toutes les
mesures propres A 6liminer le manquement et A restaurer l'effet voulu du
droit communautaire. A ce titre il peut 6galement atre oblig6 de r6parer les
dommages qu'il a causes aux particuliers de fait du son comportement ill-
gal.
5. En vertu du droit communautaire, Ia responsabilit6 de l'Etat membre
doit tre susceptible d'tre engage6 au moins dans les cas dans lesquels sont
r~unies les conditions qui engageraient Ia responsibilit6 de Ia Communaut
en raison de la violation du droit communautaire par i'une de ses institu-
tions. Dans le cas d'une directive, qui aurait di tre transpose6 au moyen
d'un acte normatif, il suffit ds lors que les dispositions pertinentes de Ia
directive aient pour but de prot~ger les intrts des particuliers. La condi-
tion d'une violation suffisamment caract~ris~e d'une rbgle superieure de
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The Advocate General stated that the Court must decide
the general issue of whether Member States were liable for
non-implementation of a directive by virtue of Community law.
His views, which were ultimately accepted by the Court, were
contrary to the views of the four Member States which had sub-
mitted arguments. They had denied that states were bound by
Community law to pay compensation even for breach of directly
applicable rules of Community law.58 The gap between these
arguments and the view finally adopted by the Court is consid-
erable.
The Advocate General began by referring to a series of
cases in which the Court had said that, under Article 5 of the
EEC Treaty,5" national courts must provide effective protec-
tion for rights under EC law.6 ° These cases concerned rights
droit doit en effet tre consid6r~e comme 6tablie dans l'hypoth~se oil la
Cour a constat6 le manquement de l'Etat membre dans un arr&t prononc6
au titre des articles 169 i 171.
6. En l'6tat actuel du droit communautaire, l'action en responsabilit6 ainsi
intent6e devant lejuge national i l'encontre d'un Etat membre relive, pour
ce qui concerne les autres aspects et notamment l'6valuation du pr6judice
subi et les modalit6s de proc6dure, des r6gles du droit national, sous la
double r6serve que celles-ci ne sauraient tre moins favorables que celles
qui concernent des r6clamations semblables de nature interne et qu'elles ne
sauraient tre am6nag6es de mani~re A rendre practiquement impossible le
r6paration du pr6judice subi. Ceci implique au minimum que les voies de
droit les plus ad6quates existant dans l'ordrejuridique national doivent &tre
interpr6t&es de fafon i respecter ces exigences, et mme qu'une voie de
droit appropri6e doit tre cr66e s'il n'en existe pas.
7. L'action en responsabilit6 est d'une nature diff6rente de I'action en
paiement au titre des dispositions d'une directive ayant un effet direct. II ne
s'agit pas d'aboutir, par une voie dtourn6e, au mme resultat que si les
dispositions de la directive avaient un effet direct. Le pr6judice peut tre
6valu6 par lejuge national "ex aequo et bono." Les dispositions de la direc-
tive peuvent cependant lui servir de point de r6f6rence.
8. Compte tenu de l'incertitude qui a regnejusqu'A pr6sent en ce qui con-
cerne la responsabilit6 des Etats membres en cas de manquement au droit
communautaire et des cons6quences financiires que votre arr~t pourrait en-
trainer pour des manquements intervenus dans le pass6, il y a lieu de limiter
dans le temps les effets de votre arrt.
Id. 33.
58. Id. 32-36.
59. Temple Lang, supra note 17 at 645-81; see NV Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-
produktiebedrijven, Case T-39/90, slip op. 57 (Eur. Ct. J. Dec. 12, 1991) (not yet
reported). Article 5 of the EEC Treaty obligesnational authorities, including courts,
to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of
the Treaty. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
60. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 37-52. The most im-
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given by rules which are directly applicable without an imple-
menting measure, unlike directives.6 ' In fact, many of these
cases concerned the rights to obtain repayment of taxes im-
posed contrary to EC rules. However, for this purpose the Ad-
vocate General rejected any distinction between repayment of
sums paid and claims for unascertained amounts as damages.
The Foster judgment showed this distinction to be unjustified.6"
The four Member States argued that EC law imposed no
duty to pay damages, and that national laws could freely deter-
mine if and under what conditions damages would be recov-
ered.63 The Advocate General appropriately rejected this ar-
gument. The Court has stated in many cases that EC law gives
the right, and that national law governs only the means of ex-
ercising it, through, for example, procedural rules or choice of
court rules.6 4 The Court has expressly said that national law
must not make it impossible in practice to exercise rights given
by EC law, which national courts are obliged to protect.65
Therefore, a national authority could not plead that it
need not pay damages under EC law merely because it would
not have to pay damages under national law in the same or
similar circumstances. In fact, a national legislature under na-
tional law is almost never in the position that it is in under EC
law when it is obliged to adopt a directive. The Advocate Gen-
portant of the many cases he cited seem to be Bozzetti v. Invernizzi SpA and Minis-
tero del Tesoro, Case 179/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2301, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 246; San Gior-
gio, Case 199/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3595, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 658; Amministrazione delle
Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 263; San Antonio Russo v. Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi sul Mercato
Agricolo (AIMA), Case 60/75, [1976] E.C.R. 45, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH); Rewe, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533.
61. See supra note 60.
62. E.g., Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 41; see Foster, Case
C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. 3313, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833, aff'd, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
Foster concerned a claim for damages by some female employees for having been
obliged to retire at the age of 60, while the age for compulsory retirement for men
was 65. [1990] E.C.R. 3313, [1990] C.M.L.R. 833. The judgment in Foster also as-
sumed that compensation could be recovered from a state enterprise for breach of a
directive. [1990] E.C.R. 3313, [1990] C.M.L.R. 833. Unlike most of the other cases
cited by the Advocate General, Foster was not concerned with a directly applicable
rule. It was also a case in which compensation was the only remedy which could be
effective. Id.
63. E.g., Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 36, 43.
64. See generally id. 36-52.
65. Id. 46-49; see, e.g., Rewe, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, [1977] 1
C.M.L.R. 533.
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eral said that, when obliged to implement a directive, a na-
tional legislature is in a position close to that of a national gov-
ernment obliged to execute a law.66
The Advocate General then discussed the judgments in
Factortame67 and Zuckerfabrik Suederdithmarschen AG and Zuck-
erfabrik Soest GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe (Zuckerfabrik ).68 In
Factortame, as already explained, the Court stated that EC law
obliges national courts to exercise powers, including powers
which do not exist under national law, when they are necessary
to give a remedy which is needed to protect the Community
law right.6 9
In Zuckerfabrik, the Court stated that national courts have
the power to suspend national administrative measures when
the grounds for suspension are themselves Community law ar-
guments regardless of whether the administrative measures
are based on Community law or on national law.70 National
courts should perform this measure essentially in circum-
stances corresponding to those in which the Court itself will
suspend acts of the Community institutions.7' Community
law, not national law, defines the circumstances under which
interlocutory relief should be given in order to protect a provi-
sionally established substantive right based on Community
law.72 The Advocate General, therefore, stated that when the
right is based on EC law, the protection given by national law
to that right should be at least as effective as the protection
given to a national law, irrespective of whether the issue is the
compatibility of national law with EC law or the validity of na-
tional secondary measures based on EC law.7" Any such differ-
ences would prejudice the fundamental requirement of uni-
66. See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 46-49.
67. Factortame, Case C-213/89, [19901 E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
68. Zuckerfabrik Suederdithmarschen AG and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v.
Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, Joined Cases C-143/88 & C-92/89, [1991] E.C.R. 534 [herein-
after Zuckerfabrik].
69. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 53; Factortame, [1990]
E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1; see supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Factortame decision).
70. See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 54-56 (discussing
Zuckerfabrik).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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form application of EC law. 74 The Advocate General con-
cluded that EC law gives a right to claim damages for breach of
a directly applicable rule of EC law.75 If this had not been so, a
fortiori, no right to damages would be given in the case of non-
directly applicable rules such as directives.
The Advocate General began his discussion of state re-
sponsibility in cases of non-directly applicable rules by recal-
ling that the Court had stated that proceedings by the Com-
mission against Member States for failure to fulfill their obliga-
tions, even after the obligation had been fulfilled belatedly, can
have a useful purpose such as establishing the basis for the lia-
bility of the state vis-i-vis other Member States, the Commu-
nity, or private parties.76 The Court had also recognized that it
might be necessary for national authorities to take supplemen-
tary steps when the Court finds that the state had not fulfilled
its obligations, other than merely recognizing the Court's rul-
ing as res judicata."
The Advocate General then made the crucial argument
that, by failing to implement a directive, a Member State fails
to give Community law the effect that it is supposed to have:
to give rights to individuals and companies.78 Such a failure
can be corrected, at least in part, by permitting individuals to
recover damages. 79 He found this principle in an old judg-
ment of the Court in Humblet v. Belgium .80 He also concluded
from the judgment in Procureur de la Re'publique & Comiti National
de Defense contre l'Alcoolisme v. Waterkeyn (Waterkeyn )81 that private
parties do not need to wait for a judgment of the Court before
claiming their rights in national courts; this principle is impor-
tant in assessing the consequences of the Francovich judg-
ment. 82 He added that even if there is a national law rule that
the legislature cannot be sued for damages, not only would
that rule be overridden by Community law, but it would be
74. Id.
75. Id. 62.
76. See generally, id. 57-69.
77. Id. 58.
78. Id. 60.
79. Id. 4 60-62.
80. Id. 63; Humbler v. Belgium, Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 559.
81. Joined Cases 314-16/81 & 83/82, [1982] E.C.R. 4337, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R.
145.
82. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 64.
EC MEMBER STATE LIABILITY
irrelevant in the case of many directives which can be imple-
mented fully by national measures other than legislation. 3 He
concluded, therefore, that when a state is found to have failed
to implement a directive---even one without direct effects-the
Member State is bound to give the private parties, whose rights
the directive was intended to protect, "adequate judicial means
of asserting their rights" by claims for damages against the
state, if necessary. 4
The Advocate General then raised the issue of whether a
distinction should be drawn betweent directives which are in-
tended, when implemented, to create duties only for private
parties, and directives which, when implemented, are intended
to create obligations for the state.8 5 In the first case, the state
is responsible only for its failure to implement the directive. It
is not responsible for anything else, such as the;failure to pay
an employee's salary, the failure to pay a woman the same sal-
ary as a man, or the negligent production of a defective or dan-
gerous product.86 All the previous arguments were based on
the principle that all failures to implement directives are auto-
matically violations of Articles 5 and 189 of the EEC Treaty
and should be remedied by the state if loss has been caused to
a private party.8 7
2. On Conditions for Damage Claims
Having concluded that Member States could be liable to
pay damages for failure to implement directives, the Advocate
General then considered the circumstances in which this liabil-
ity would arise.8 He suggested that the duty to pay damages
should arise in circumstances corresponding to those in which
the Community would be obliged to pay compensation for
breach of Community law by a Community institution under
Article 215 of the EEC Treaty." On this point the Court cor-
rectly did not agree with his conclusions. The failure of a state
83. Id. 7 64-65.
84. Id. 66.
85. Id. 67-68.
86. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
87. See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 68.
88. See generally id. $ 70-81.
89. See id. 71. Advocate General Mischo stated that a damage award from a
national judge should be comparable to the Court's damage award for a violation of
the same Community law. Id.
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to implement a directive is a concrete, readily identifiable, for-
mal violation of Community law for which no justification is
permitted. There is therefore no reason to say that, if a state is
liable at all for non-implementation of a directive, it should be
liable only when the other requirements for the non-contrac-
tual liability of the Community are also fulfilled.
If a Community legislative measure is challenged, which in
the Advocate General's view might be comparable to the na-
tional measure needed to implement a directive, the Commu-
nity is liable only if the Community has exercised its discretion
as legislator in such a way as to commit a clear violation of a
higher rule of law protecting individuals, clearly and seriously
exceeding its powers.90 Such a strict prerequisite for liability is
appropriate when damages are sought from a legislature for its
choice of legislative policy. There would be no justification for
making it a prerequisite for liability for failure to implement a
directive, which is a simple failure to fulfill a precise non-dis-
cretionary commitment clearly imposed by Article 189 of the
EEC Treaty.9
The Advocate General tried to overcome this difficulty by
proposing that in all cases in which the Court had held that a
state failed to implement a directive, the state would be re-
garded as having infringed a fundamental rule of the Treaty.9"
This assertion is no doubt correct, but it makes it unnecessary
to refer to the Court's case law on the non-contractual liability
of the Community. The Advocate General then weakened his
own argument by adding, correctly, that the implementation of
a directive, involving no discretion as to the result, was not
comparable to the policy choices made by the Community leg-
islature.9"
The Advocate General then suggested that the effects of
the Court's judgment should be applied only prospectively.9 4
Thus, private parties should be able to recover damages only
for losses suffered after the date of the judgment, except in
favor of plaintiffs who had issued proceedings before that
90. Id. 72-74.
91. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189.
92. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 74, 76; see Commission
v. Germany, Case 70/72, [1973] E.C.R. 813, 829, [1973] C.M.L.R. 741, 764.
93. See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, 76.
94. Id. 82-87.
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date.95 Such a time limitation has been previously adopted by
the Court.9 6 In this respect, the Court did not follow his ad-
vice.
B. The Judgment of the Court of Justice
1. On the Question of Principle
The Court's judgment in Francovich first considered and
rejected the argument based on the terms of the Directive it-
self, and then turned to the question of whether a Member
State could be liable for damages for a loss caused by its failure
to implement a directive.97 The relevant part of the judgment
is short and clear. Unlike the Advocate General, the Court did
not try to build its conclusion elaborately from its previous
case law.98
The Court stated that the EEC Treaty had created its own
legal order which is integrated with the legal systems of Mem-
ber States, and which binds their courts. 99 The subjects of the
Community legal order are not only Member States but also its
citizens.' 00 Just as the Community legal order creates duties
for private parties, it gives them rights which are part of their
legal heritage (patrimoinejuridique).'0' These rights arise not
only as a result of explicit provisions of the Treaty, but also as
a result of the obligations that the Treaty imposes in a clearly
defined way on private parties, Member States, and Commu-
nity institutions. 0 2 National courts must apply, within their ju-
risdictions, the rules of Community law, and must ensure their
95. Id. 1 86.
96. Id.
97. See Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov.
19, 1990) (not yet reported); see also Reports on European Union, 8 E.C. BULL., Supp.
9/75, at 18 (1975), where the Court stated that the protection of the rights of individ-
uals under EC law "presupposes that in the event of failure by a State to fulfill an
obligation, persons adversely affected thereby may obtain redress before their na-
tional courts." Id.
98. See generally Francovich, slip op.
99. Id. 11 35-36.
100. Id. 36; see NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
& Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1,
12, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 129.
101. See Francovich, slip op. 1 36.
102. Id. 11 35-36.
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full effect.'0° They must protect the rights that the rules give
to private parties. 0 4
So far, the Court was essentially summarizing its previous
case law, but it went on to say that the full effectiveness of
Community rules would be called into question, and the pro-
tection of the rights that it recognizes would be weakened, if
private parties did not have the possibility of obtaining com-
pensation when their rights were infringed by a breach of
Community law by a Member State. 05 The possibility of
claiming damages from a Member State is particularly indis-
pensable when, as in the Francovich case, the full effect of the
Community rules depends upon action by the state and when,
as a result, private parties cannot claim, in national courts, the
rights that Community law gives them.'0 6 It follows, the Court
stated, that the principle of state responsibility for loss caused
to private parties by infringement of Community law for which
states are responsible is inherent in the system of the
Treaty. 107
The Court then gave a second, separate argument for its
conclusion.10" It stated that the Member States' obligation to
pay compensation for loss was also based on Article 5 of the
EEC Treaty.' 0 9 Article 5 imposes obligations which include
the duty to put an end to the unlawful consequences of a
breach of Community law. t"' At this point the Court, like the
Advocate General, cited the Humblet judgment."'
2. On Conditions for State Liability
The Court next considered the conditions which must be
fulfilled for a state to be liable." 2 These conditions depend on
the nature of the breach of Community law which causes the
103. Id. 36. This would include the obligation to eliminate the unlawful con-
sequences of a violation of Community law. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. 33.
106. Id. 34.
107. Id. 35-36.
108. Id. 1 36.
109. Id.
110. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
111. See Humblet v. Belgium, Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 559.
112. See Francovich, slip op. 38.
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loss." ' When, as in the Francovich case, the Member State fails
to fulfill its Article 189" 4 obligation to take the necessary
measures to bring about the result required by the directive,
the need to ensure the full effectiveness of the Community rule
requires a right to damages when three conditions are met" 5
First, the directive must give rights to private parties." 16 Sec-
ond, the content of these rights must be identified on the basis
of the directive.' 7 Third, there must be a causal link between
the violation of the state's obligation and the loss suffered by
the plaintiff."" If these conditions are fulfilled, there is a right
to compensation.' ' 9 These conditions were fulfilled in the
Francovich case.12 0
Subject to these principles, national law determines which
courts have jurisdiction and what procedural rules are applica-
ble. 12 ' These national law rules must not be less favorable
than those applicable to corresponding claims under national
law, and must not make it practically impossible or excessively
difficult to recover damages. 2 2 The Court noted but did not
rely upon the fact that it had previously declared that Italy had
failed to fulfill its obligation to implement the directive. 2 3 It
seems clear, therefore, that such a decision is not a prerequi-
site for a claim for compensation of this kind in a national
court, and there is no reason why it should be.
III. COMMENTS ON THE FRANCOVICH JUDGMENT
A. On the Principle of State Responsibility
The language of the Court is extremely and, no doubt, in-
tentionally broad. It was clearly intended to apply to all
breaches by a Member State of any rule of Community law. In
effect, therefore, the Court has extended the rule that damages
113. Id.
114. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189.
115. See Francovich, slip op. 39.
116. Id. 40.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. 39.
120. See id.
121. Id. 42.
122. Id. 43.
123. Commission v. Italy, Case 22/87, [1989] E.C.R. 143, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R.
490.
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can be recovered against a state for breach of directly applica-
ble rules to all rules of Community law when the breach is due
to action or inaction by the state, irrespective of which organ of
the state has failed to act.' 24 The right to obtain compensation
applies whether the damages are precisely known or must be
calculated by the courts. 25 The right is not limited to recover-
ing sums collected by tax authorities contrary to Community
law. 126 As far as directives or any provision of the Treaty that
requires implementation by a Member State are concerned,
the right to damages arises when the Community rule is not
implemented at all, or when it is inadequately or incorrectly
implemented. 2
7
When a Member State has infringed Community law,
damages are not the only remedy available. The national rem-
edies which are most appropriate to produce an effective rem-
edy must be used. 28 If no effective national remedy is avail-
able, Community law obliges the national court to disregard
any national rule preventing the appropriate remedy from be-
ing given.' 29 Community law apparently obliges the national
court to create a remedy that fulfills the obligations of the state
under Community law.130 The national court is bound to
achieve the result required by Community law, just as the na-
tional legislature is bound.' 3 '
The Francovich judgment demonstrates that Factortame was
particularly important in this respect. Francovich shows that the
private parties in Factortame could have obtained compensation
if they had ultimately won their case on Community law
grounds. In Factortame, however, the parties were granted a
more effective remedy than compensation would have been.13 2
124. See Francovich,Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet
reported).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. 46.
128. Francovich, slip op. 42.
129. Id.; see generally Factortame, Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, 2452,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 8 (stating compensation is not always a satisfactory alternative to
interim measures); see also Italsolar spA v. Commission, Case C-257/90-R, [1991] 2
C.M.L.R. 335; Compagnia Italiana Alcool v. Commission, Case C-358/90R, [1990]
E.C.R. 4887.
130. Francovich, slip op. 42.
131. Id.
132. See Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. at 2437, [1990] C.M.L.R. at 29.
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It could be argued that the result in Factortame might have been
different had the Francovich judgment come first. This asser-
tion does not appear to be likely because the Advocate General
in Factortame stated that the absence under English law of any
right to compensation was open to criticism in light of the du-
ties of national courts to give full effect to Community law.' 3'
The Court was, therefore, aware that Community law might
give a right to compensation in the circumstances of the
Factortame case, and arrived at its conclusion despite that.
A claim against a state for damages arising from a breach
of Community law by failure to implement a directive, or by
inadequate or incorrect implementation, is quite distinct from
any claim that might be made against the state on the basis of a
directive, or on the basis of any national measure implement-
ing a directive. This is not merely an academic point; different
procedural rules, for example, or different periods of limita-
tion might apply to different types of claims. General princi-
ples of Community law determine the substantive rules for
claims for compensation for non-implementation or incorrect
implementation, while the provisions of the directive itself
govern claims in accordance with it.
By the Francovich and Factortame judgments, the Court has
provided comprehensive and greatly improved protection for
the rights of private parties under Community law. The impli-
cations of the previous case law of the Court for claims for
damages against Member States for breach of directly applica-
ble Community law rules had not been fully understood. 34
No doubt the Court has also ensured a much better level
of voluntary compliance with EC law by national authorities of
Member States. If they were previously lax in implementing or
tempted to postpone implementation of directives, national
authorities should now know that they will be obliged to pay
compensation for loss caused by their inaction. This principle
should ensure that EC measures are implemented more
promptly and fully, and accorded greater respect than they
have had in the past.
The Francovich judgment should not cause surprise. It
would be surprising only if it were assumed that an EC Mem-
133. See id. at 2463, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 22.
134. Temple Lang, supra note 16, at 645-81.
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ber State ought to be able to infringe its obligations under EC
law with impunity even if it thereby causes loss to individuals.
The Court was surely right to reject this proposition, and to do
so on the basis that Member States are subjects of Community
law with duties under Community law owed to private parties,
as well as to other Member States and the Community institu-
tions. ' 5 When a Member State fails to fulfill its obligations
under Community law, its own national courts must, as far as
possible, remedy the failure and protect, even against their
own state, Community law rights which the Member State has
failed to protect. 36 The fact that Community law prevails over
national law implies all appropriate remedies as well as sub-
stantive results.
Apart from the failure of some lawyers to regard Member
States as subjects of Community law, why was the Francovich
judgment thought surprising? One reason was the majority
judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Bourgoin v. Ministry
for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. '31 In that case, the majority
decided that a Member State is not liable for loss caused by
breach of a directly applicable rule of Community law unless
the conditions for the liability of the Community under Article
215 were met.' 38 However, the case is unsatisfactory for vari-
ous reasons. Of the four judges who gave judgments in the
High Court and Court of Appeal, two held that states are auto-
matically liable. The two judges who stated that states are lia-
ble only if the conditions of Article 215 are fulfilled did not
consider fully whether they were in fact fulfilled, and simply
assumed that they were not.'39 The reasons given by the two
judges who considered that breach of a directly applicable
Community law rule made a state liable were much more con-
vincing, even before Francovich, than were the reasons given by
the majority in the Court of Appeal.' 40 The case was settled
immediately after the judgment of the Court of Appeal, by the
135. See Francovich, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 35-36 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov.
19, 1991) (not yet reported).
136. Id. 42.
137. [1986] 1 Q.B. 716.
138. Id. at 787.
139. See id.
140. See John Temple Lang, The Duties of National Courts Under the Constitu-
tional Law of the European Community, Lasok Lecture at Exeter (1987); see also Re-
ports on European Union, supra note 97, 8 E.C. BULL., Supp. 9/75, at 18.
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payment of about £3,500,000 to the plaintiffs.' 4 ' The judg-
ment of the majority in the Court of Appeal should now be
considered overruled by Francovich, because the first reason
given by the Court in Francovich corresponds precisely to the
main argument of the dissenting judge in the Court of Ap-
peal. 14
2
Another reason for the surprise at the result in Francovich
was the widespread failure to note the significance of the
Court's case law permitting refunds of taxes collected in
breach of Community law. Additionally, some assumed that
the Court would not say that there is a right to damages for
failure to implement non-directly applicable rules until the
case law had gone further in more obvious respects. 43
The Francovich and Factortame judgments make it clear that
Community law may impose on national courts a duty to give
remedies other than damages against their own states when
these are needed to protect rights given by Community law di-
rectives."14  If existing national law prohibits activities that
would be permitted by the directive if it were implemented (as-
suming that the directive is in force, precise and uncondi-
tional), a private party has several possibilities. It may go
ahead and risk legal proceedings against it by the state, plan-
ning to defend itself using the argument, outlined above, that,
in litigation, the state cannot take advantage of its own failure
to implement the directive. A similar result would be achieved
by seeking judicial review and annulment of any administrative
action based on the national law and inconsistent with the di-
rective.
In light of Francovich, a private party instead may ask the
national courts for a declaration that it is entitled to act in ac-
cordance with the directive. Such a declaration could be given
against the state. The same result could be achieved, if it were
more appropriate under national law, by an injunction to the
relevant state authority ordering it not to interfere with the ac-
tivities of the plaintiff permitted by the directive. In general,
now that it is clear that private parties can use directives in
141. Bourgoin, 1 QB. 716.
142. Compare id. with Francovich, slip op. 33-36.
143. See, e.g., Becker, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499.
144. See supra notes 3 and 44 and accompanying text.
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claims that they make against the state, there is no reason why
they have to wait until loss and inconvenience have been suf-
fered, or serious legal risks taken, before suing in whatever way
may be appropriate. However, until the directive is imple-
mented, a private party apparently cannot assert against other
private parties rights which it would have if the directive were
properly implemented.' 45 There also does not seem to be any
other way in which a private party can achieve this result.
The Francovich principle is not limited to acts or omissions
of the legislature. Acts or omissions by any of the executive or
administrative parts of government may also give rise to claims
for damages or other appropriate remedy. 4 '
How effective does Community law require the remedy to
be? The Court has not answered this question comprehen-
sively, and no doubt it would be very difficult to do so. But we
suggest that the conclusions of Advocate General Tesauro in
Factortame indicate that the remedy given should be available
reasonably promptly and should, as far as practically possible,
put the plaintiff in the same position as if its rights under Com-
munity law had been fully respected. 47 This goes further than
the Court's statement that the national law must provide as ef-
fective a remedy for violation of Community law as for breach
of national law and that national rules must not make it impos-
sible in practice to exercise the Community law right. 48 Rea-
sonable promptness may be essential for the protection of any
right, and the test of merely not making it impossible or very
difficult can hardly be adequate. Such an ineffectual test might
allow the private party to suffer substantial loss, and the pri-
vate party would then have a second claim for compensation
for that loss, on the basis of Francovich. It would not make
sense that plaintiffs should be obliged to make two claims, and
therefore, the test suggested above is the correct one. In most
legal systems when rights are infringed, the courts do every-
145. Marshall, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, 734, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688,
700.
146. See Francovich, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 34 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19,
1991) (not yet reported).
147. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Factortame, Case C-213/89,
[1990] E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
148. See, e.g., Rewe, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997-98, [1977] 1
C.M.L.R. 533, 550-51.
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thing possible in practice to restore the plaintiff to the position
in which he would have been had his rights not been in-
fringed. 4 9 There is no obvious reason for saying that Com-
munity rights should be significantly less protected. But, if this
is correct, it will be necessary to define the rights given by
Community law more precisely, so as to see whether particular
rules of national law permit them to be completely and effec-
tively protected.
Once again, the Court summons the help of national
courts to consolidate, apply, and enforce the Community law
system. Every national judge is now a Community law
judge.150 The Francovich judgment is just one more concrete
practical result of the cooperation and symbiosis between the
Court and national tribunals.
B. On Fundamental Rights
The Francovich judgment also implies that, in the sphere of
Community law, national courts have a duty to award damages
and other remedies against their own state's authorities for a
breach of Community law principles on fundamental rights.
This assertion requires explanation. The Court has repeatedly
stated' 5 ' that Community law includes principles of "funda-
mental human rights," drawn from the European Convention
on Human Rights ("Human Rights Convention") 52 and from
the national constitutional laws of Member States. These prin-
ciples bind the Community institutions. Moreover, it is now
149. See id.
150. Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R. 303,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334 (Ct. First Instance); Brian Walsh, Reflections on the Effects of
Membership of the European Communities in Irish Law, in Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU
DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION (F. Capotorti et al. eds., 1986); PIERRE PESCATORE, LIBER
AMICORUM 807 (1987); Jongeneel Kaas BV v. Netherlands, Case 237/82, [1984]
E.C.R. 483, 520, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 53, 79.
151. See, e.g., Staatsanwalt Freiburg v. Keller, Case 234/85, [1986] E.C.R. 2897,
[1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 875; Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabu-
lary, Case 222/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240; Commission v. Ger-
many, Case 116/82, [1986] E.C.R. 2519; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79,
[1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42; National Panasonic, Ltd. v. Commission,
Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2033, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169; Testa, Maggio, & Vitale v.
Bundesanstalt fir Arbeit, Joined Cases 41, 121 & 796/79, [19801 E.C.R. 1979, [1981]
2 C.M.L.R. 552.
152. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Human Rights Conven-
tion].
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clear that they also bind Member States in the sphere of Com-
munity law. This sphere includes: when Member States imple-
ment Community measures, when Member States adopt meas-
ures affecting rights given or protected by Community law or
in areas specifically regulated by Community law, and when
Member States take measures on behalf of the Community, as
its trustees or agents of necessity. 5 3 There is nothing very
surprising about this conclusion either. The Human Rights
Convention contains provisions for payment of compensation
by a state for its infringements of the Convention. 54 At least
some national constitutional laws also provide for payment of
compensation for breach of constitutional rights by state au-
thorities. 55 Whether the fundamental rights principles in
Community law are regarded as directly applicable or not,
Francovich shows that individuals can obtain compensation for
loss if they are infringed, and Factortame shows that they can
obtain other remedies if they are appropriate.
C. On Specific Conditions for State Liability
The Court made it clear that three conditions, the neces-
sary and sufficient requirements for a claim for damages, apply
to claims for loss due to failure to implement a directive.'56
The requirements would not necessarily be the same in other
cases. The first condition is that the directive must give rights
to private parties.' 57 Some directives may be intended only to
regulate relations between administrations or to protect the
general interest in, for example, a cleaner environment, with-
out necessarily creating rights for any particular individuals or
companies. Other directives are only concerned with the du-
153. John Temple Lang, The Sphere in which Member States Are Obliged to Comply with
the General Principles of Law and Community Fundamental Rights Principles, in LEGAL ISSUES
OF EUROPEAN INTERGRATION 91(2) (1992).
154. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 152, art. 13. Article 13 of the
Human Rights Convention requires "an effective remedy." Id.
155. See e.g., Meskill v. C.I.E., 1973 I.R. 121; Educational Co. of Ireland v. Fitz-
patrick, 1961 I.R. 345; S.P.U.C. v. Grogan, 1990 I.L.R.M. 350. In the United States,
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides for state immunity but this
has been set aside by Congress in the case of, for example, violations by states of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Injunctions are given by federal courts
preventing states from infringing federal laws.
156. See Francovich, Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, slip op. 39 (Eur. Ct. J.
Nov. 19, 1991) (not yet reported).
157. Id. 40.
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ties of private parties, and do not necessarily create corre-
sponding rights for others. Presumably, the directive must, on
its correct interpretation, give rights to private parties of a
class of which the plaintiff is one, or in circumstances in which
the plaintiff is situated. 58 It is not enough that the directive
gives rights to someone. It is not important, however, whether
the rights intended to be given by the directive are against the
state or against private parties.
The second condition requires that the content of the
rights given to private parties by the directive must be identi-
fied and clear on the basis of the directive. 59 The rights given
must be stated precisely enough in the directive itself for
courts to determine whether they have been infringed, and, if
so, precisely in what respect, and in what quantum of dam-
ages.' 60 It is not enough that some rights have been given if it
is unclear what those rights are.
A directive that, on the relevant point, was conditional on
a choice to be made by the implementing state would not give
identifiable rights. Furthermore, a directive that was too vague
might not give rights that were clear enough to be enforced by
courts without implementing measures. The second condi-
tion, therefore, is similar to, though not the same as, one of the
requirements for a directive to have direct effects in litigation
against the state. Directives concerned with harmonization of
law do not necessarily create rights for individuals; this de-
pends on what laws are being harmonized. Where a directive
gives wide discretion to national authorities as to how it may
be implemented, the directive may give certain minimal rights
to individuals. The directive may leave it up to the states to
decide whether to give wider rights.
The third condition is common in any claim for damages:
there must be a causal relationship linking the breach of the
right and the loss caused to the person claiming compensa-
tion.' 6' This implies that the nature and extent of the right
given by the directive will influence or determine the kinds of
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
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loss for which compensation can be claimed, and the quantum
of damages.
It will be seen that the terms of the directive are very im-
portant, indeed all-important, for all three conditions. How-
ever, directives -have not yet been drafted with these issues in
mind, and many directives may not clearly answer the ques-
tions that arise from the Court's three conditions. If a direc-
tive is not clear in any relevant respect, the question of its in-
terpretation can be referred by a national court to the Court in
Luxembourg under Article 177.162
Presumably, the same three conditions apply when the
plaintiff claims damages for incorrect or inadequate implemen-
tation of a directive. The plaintiff then has to show that an
identifiable right given by the directive to individuals or com-
panies, of which the plaintiff is one, has not been translated
into national law. But this is less important than it might seem,
because of the rule that national measures intended to imple-
ment a directive must, if possible, be interpreted so as to fulfill
the state's obligations under the directive. Only if such an in-
terpretation is not possible will a claim against the state for
damages for insufficient or incorrect implementation arise.
The case of Marleasing SA v. Comercial Internacional de Alimenta-
cion SA shows that the Court is willing to go very far to oblige
national courts to interpret legislation in accordance with di-
rectives. ' 63
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRANCOVICH JUDGMENT
A. Damages for Breach of Directly Applicable Rules
Obviously, the Francovich judgment indirectly but clearly
confirms that private parties may sue a Member State for any
action which infringes a directly applicable rule of Community
law, and which causes loss to them.' 64 Directly applicable rules
are defined as those which are both unconditional and clear
and precise enough to be applied by national courts. 65 It fol-
162. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
163. See supra notes 26 and 30 (citing Marleasing).
164. See Francovich, slip op. 27.
165. Becker, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499; Francovich,
slip op. 11 (reaffirming Court's holding in Becker, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1
C.M.L.R. 499).
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lows that the first two conditions of Francovich, if they are re-
garded as applicable by analogy in cases of breach of directly
applicable rules, will always be fulfilled. They seem to add lit-
tle to the previous case law of the Court on those rules,
although they clarify what might otherwise have been in doubt.
The Francovich judgment will, however, have the very impor-
tant effect of calling the attention of lawyers to the case law on
directly applicable rules. A big increase in the number of
claims for damages for breach of those rules certainly can be
expected.
Many directly applicable rules prohibit protectionist dif-
ferences in treatment resulting from national legislation. Arti-
cle 90 of the EEC Treaty is an increasingly important article,166
which has been held to be directly applicable in this situa-
tion. 67 This article prohibits state measures, even in the case
of state enterprises and enterprises with special or exclusive
rights, which authorize, require, encourage, or approve behav-
ior which infringes on the Treaty, including (but not limited
to) the competition rules. 68 The possibility of suing the state,
as well as the enterprise infringing the competition rules, for
compensation for loss caused by breach of Article 90 now
clearly exists, and should help to discourage such breaches.
B. Directives and Rights of Private Parties
When does a rule of Community law, although not directly
applicable, give rights to private parties? In most Member
States there is case law on the question of whether national
legislation imposing duties was also intended to create private
166. See John Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and Government Measures Re-
lating to Public and Privileged Enterprises: Article 90 EEC Treaty, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INST. 543 (Barry Hawk ed., 1985); Jean-Frangois Verstrynge, The Obligations of
Member States as Regards Competition in the EEC Treaty, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
17-1 (Barry Hawk ed., 1989); Pierre Pescatore, Public and Private Aspects of Community
Competition Law, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 381-430 (Barry Hawk ed., 1987); see
also PTT Netherland, Cases C- 48/90 and C-66/90 (Eur. Ct.J. Feb. 12, 1992) (not yet
reported); Hofner and Elser, Case C-41/90 (Eur. Ct. J. Apr. 23, 1991) (not yet re-
ported); France v. Commission, Case C-202/88 (Eur. Ct. J. Mar. 19, 1991) (not yet
reported).
167. Article 90 was held to be directly applicable in, for example, State v. Sacchi,
Case 155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, $ 18, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177; BRT v. SABAM, Case
127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 313, 318, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 233, 238; Porto di Genova, Case
C-179/90, slip op. 23 (Eur. Ct.J. Dec. 10, 1991) (not yet reported).
168. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90.
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rights (schutznormtheorie). However, this concept is not directly
relevant to directives under Community law, which are in-
tended to be implemented by other measures. The answer de-
pends on the terms of each directive, and cannot be answered
definitely merely by reference to general principles. However,
some comments may be useful.
If the directive requires the adoption of measures giving
procedural or other rights to private parties, the directive itself
fulfills the first Francovich condition. If other Community rules
associated with the directive-for example, previous directives
on the same subject, or an associated regulation-give rights
to individuals, the directive almost certainly does so also. If
the directive applies in a sphere of law in which national laws
already give rights to private parties, so that there is no need for
Community law to do so expressly, or if national law gives
rights for breach of national measures such as those needed to
implement the directive, then the directive is likely to give pri-
vate rights. This principle is important, because in most Mem-
ber States, the failure to fulfill duties imposed by legislation is
often actionable as a tort or private wrong (breach of statutory
duty in English and Irish law, and almost the whole French law
of delicts). The directive need not be the only source of the
rights which it regulates or confers. In other words, a directive
may give rights not only because of its own provisions but be-
cause it is to be implemented by measures that themselves
would be regarded, under all or most national laws, as giving
private rights. It does not make a difference whether private
parties' rights were created first by the directive or whether
similar rights existed previously under the laws of some or all
Member States. 69 If this situation were not so, the effects of
non-implementation of the directive would be fundamentally
different in different Member States, depending on whether
some similar rights were given by the previous law.
Also, an anomalous and irrational distinction would be
drawn between failure to implement directives harmonizing
and modifying existing rights and failure to implement direc-
tives creating new rights. There would be no reason to limit
the Francovich principle to the latter type of situation, because
the nature of the failure by the Member State would be the
169. Id.
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same in both cases. If the directive is only concerned with co-
operation between public authorities or by public authorities
with the Community institutions, it is not likely to create any
rights for individuals. If a directive is intended to be enforced
primarily in national courts by action at the national or re-
gional level by, for example, environmental protection organi-
zations, it should be regarded as giving them rights. If the di-
rective is written so as to protect exclusively the general public
interest in, for example, a less polluted environment, it is un-
likely to create rights for private parties. However, if the sub-
ject-matter of the directive is inherently of special interest to
identifiable individuals or companies, such as the competitors
of a company receiving state aid, the immediate neighbors of a
polluter, or the creditors of a bank or pension fund, the fact
that there is a general interest in reducing pollution, in undis-
torted competition, or in the soundness of financial institu-
tions, should not mean necessarily that no private rights are
created. Some directives lay down minimum standards that
entitle the goods or services that comply with them to be of-
fered throughout the Community. Other directives go further
and prohibit Member States from imposing additional require-
ments, even on goods or services within their borders. Both
kinds of directives can create private rights. Almost all direc-
tives in the areas of social affairs and free movement of persons
appear to create rights for individuals. Most directives on free-
dom to provide services and freedom of establishment also
create rights for individuals.
Private rights, especially in the environmental area, are
often protected by general duties, for example, to minimize
pollution, or to carry out environmental impact assessments.
Such duties may be designed to set standards, for breach of
which plaintiffs can sue under general rules of law, or provide
information that plaintiffs can use to protect their interests, re-
lying on other more generally applicable procedures. As ar-
gued above, a directive must be interpreted in the context of
national laws, not merely in its context in Community law. In
fact, many if not most directives are not correctly implemented
unless the implementing measures give private parties legally
enforceable rights. 7 ' This is necessary both because rights
170. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-249/88, [19911 E.C.R. 1275; Emmott v.
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may have little value unless they are legally enforceable, and
because rights given by Community law cannot be interpreted
by the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty unless they
can be claimed in national courts with power to ask the Court
to interpret them. Such rights have to be enforceable by some-
one, and the directive in question necessarily fulfills the first of
the three Francovich conditions.
An obvious example of a directive intended to give rights
to private parties, and non-implementation of which would ful-
fill the three Francovich criteria, is the directive on manufactur-
ers' liability for defective products.' 7' Failure to implement
this directive would mean that private parties might be unable
to recover damages from manufacturers in circumstances con-
templated by the directive. 72 A claim could clearly be made
against the state.
To determine when a non-directly applicable rule gives
private rights, it is useful to look at a rule that, although di-
rectly applicable, at first sight does not appear to do so. Arti-
cles 92-94 of the EEC Treaty allow state aid to industry only in
certain conditions, and when authorized by the Commis-
sion."7 These rules might be regarded only as a general obli-
gation to avoid distortions of competition. But the Court has
held that they are directly applicable 174 and that a competitor
may challenge a Commission decision authorizing state aid.' 75
The Court has also stated that national courts must ensure that
Minister for Social Welfare, Case C-208/90, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 894; Zuckerfabrik,
Joined Cases C-143/88 & C-92/89, [1991] E.C.R. 534; Union Nationale Des En-
traineurs et Cadres Techniques Professionnels du Football v. Heylens, Case 222/86,
[1987] E.C.R. 4097, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 901; Commission v. Belgium, Case 239/85,
[1986] E.C.R. 3645, 3658-59;Johnston v. R.U.C., Case 222/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651,
[1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240; Harz v. Deutsche Tradax GmbH, Case 79/83, [1984] E.C.R.
1921, (1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430; von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430; Commission v. Netherlands, Case 96/
81, [1982] E.C.R. 1791, 1804; Commission v. Belgium, Case 102/79, [1980] E.C.R.
1473, 1486, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 293-94.
171. Directive on manufacturers liability, Council Directive No. 85/374, Oj. L
210/29.
172. Id.
173. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 92-94.
174. Some of the provisions of Articles 92-94 of the EEC Treaty were held to be
directly applicable in, for example, Lorenz v. Germany, Case 120/73, [1973] E.C.R.
1471.
175. COFAZ v. Commission, Case 169/84, [1986] E.C.R. 391, [1986] 3
C.M.L.R. 385.
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state aid is not given unless the Commission first has been duly
notified, even if the Commission might ultimately authorize
it.' 7 6 The High Court in England had ruled that a competitor
can bring an action for infringement of Articles 92-94, for
breach of statutory duty, if aid that has not been authorized
puts it at a competitive disadvantage. t 77 If state aid has been
unlawfully given, the correct course of action is for aid to be
repaid in full. If this measure is done, no loss to any competi-
tor should have occurred.
The case law on state aid, therefore, leads to two conclu-
sions. What appears to be a general rule against distortions of
competition may give rise to private rights for competitors,
even if they could not necessarily have shown precise, specific
loss as a result of the unlawful aid. Competitors have a right to
see the Community rules respected regardless of the exact
amount of their possible loss. They do not have to wait until
they suffer identifiable loss before they can sue. Even if a
plaintiff cannot prove any specific loss, it may obtain an injunc-
tion to prevent the unlawful aid from being given. -In other
words, the most effective remedy should be given promptly. In
fact, it might often be difficult to show any causal link between
the granting of state aid to the competitor and loss to another.
It may be easier to justify an injunction against the state to pre-
vent the granting of state aid than to obtain damages after the
aid is given, because of the causal link requirement of
Francovich. The difficulty of proving a causal link to any identi-
fiable quantum of damages is an argument in favor of giving an
injunction to prevent the granting of the aid, or an argument
for requiring the aid to be refunded.
It may also be useful to look at the'directives on public
contracts. 78 Broadly, these directives require non-discrimina-
tory invitations to be published before a variety of public sup-
176. Federation Nationale du Commerce Exterieur, Case C-354/90 (Eur. Ct. J.
Nov. 21, 1991) (not yet reported).
177. See Factortame, Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
178. The basic directives on public contracts are Council Directive No. 71/305,
O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1971, at 682 and Directive No. 77/62, oJ. L 13 (1977); see Coun-
cil Directive No. 80/767/EEC of July 22, 1980 adapting and supplementing in re-
spect of certain contracting authorities; Directive No. 77/62, O.J. L 215/1 (1980);
Council Directive No. 89/665 (1989) on the coordination of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the
award of public supply and public work contracts, O.J. L 395/33 (1989); Council
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ply and public service contracts are allocated by public authori-
ties in the Community. They also require Member States to
adopt procedures to give contractors the right to object to the
allocation of a contract if it is not in accordance with the rele-
vant directive. If, however, a contractor discovers too late that
the allocation was not lawful, it now seems clear from the
Francovich judgment that it can sue the public authority for
breach of the directive, even if the national implementing mea-
sure does not give it a right to sue.
One of the many questions left open by the Francovich
judgment is the question of how far environmental protection
directives' 79 should be interpreted as creating private party
rights. There is no inherent reason why they should not do so,
but they are, in practice, often written in terms of imposing
duties on public authorities or on polluters rather than creat-
ing rights. These issues are important because many environ-
mental directives have not been fully implemented. Environ-
mental protection bodies, anxious to ensure the protection of
particular areas or to ensure the adoption of a particular mea-
sure but not necessarily able to show that they are themselves
suffering any particular loss, will no doubt raise these issues
and seek to have environmental directives written in a form
which unquestionably creates private rights. Indeed, one solu-
tion to this problem might be to deliberately encourage the
enforcement of Community environmental directives by envi-
ronmental conservation bodies in national courts. This mea-
sure would involve a desirable decentralization of the enforce-
ment of Community law, and the authorities really responsible
for failure to implement or to obey directives could be made
liable or obliged to take appropriate action by their own
courts.
1. Who May Be Sued Under the Francovich Principle
The Francovich case was concerned with the simple case in
which the national legislature of the Member State had failed
to implement a directive, and the state was held liable for com-
Directive No. 90/531 (1990) on the procurement procedures of entities operating in
sectors including water, energy, and others. O.J. L 297/1 (1990).
179. See generally Rolf Wagenbaur, The European Community's Policy on Implementa-
tion of Environmental Directives, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 455 (1990-91).
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pensation.10 However, depending on the subject matter of
the directive and the constitutional structure of the Member
State in question, the measures needed to implement a direc-
tive may be the responsibility of a regional legislative, a local
administrative, or executive authority.1 8 ' The fact that it is al-
ways the Member State which is the defendant in proceedings
brought in the Court in Luxembourg by the Commission or by
another Member State under Articles 169-170 of the EEC
Treaty for failure to fulfill the state's obligations does not an-
swer the question which authority can be sued for compensa-
tion in a national court.8 2 The obvious answer is that the au-
thority which had the duty to implement and to respect the
directive can be sued for compensation in a national court.
The identification of this authority is governed by national law,
not Community law. The fact that Community law gives the
right to damages (or says that a right to damages must be given
under national law) does not mean that Community law deter-
mines which national authority should be named as defendant.
The question of who may be sued under Francovich is most
likely to arise in Member States with essentially federal struc-
tures, in which the national or federal authorities may not have
power to adopt whatever measures are needed to implement
the directive. In that case, it seems natural to say that the pro-
vincial or regional authorities who have the power should be
sued for compensation if they fail to exercise it. If both the
national or federal authorities and the provincial or regional
authorities have the power to implement the directive in ques-
tion, then either or both could be sued.
This question is important in Member States with essen-
tially federal structures because regional authorities, which are
not involved in the adoption of Community directives, are
often reluctant, slow, or inefficient in implementing them.
Therefore, in order to make the Community legal system more
effective, it may be important to establish that a regional or
provincial government is liable to pay compensation, in ac-
180. Francovich, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 7 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 19,
1991) (not yet reported).
181. See Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Commune di Milano, Case 103/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 1839, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 239 (holding that local authorities are bound by di-
rectives like national authorities).
182. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 169-70.
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cordance with the Francovich principle, when it has exclusive
jurisdiction to implement a directive and fails to do so.
2. Damages Available to Parties Under the
Francovich Principle
A very closely related question also arises in unitary states.
The question is illustrated by the example, given above, of a
public authority that fails to fulfill its obligations under one of
the directives addressing public contracts. Because the public
authority is a state body against which the directive can be
pleaded even if it has not been implemented, the authority
would be liable for damages whether or not the directive was
implemented. It seems that it would also be liable whether or
not the national implementing legislation gave a right to dam-
ages, because it would be responsible, in the specific case, for
both the infringement of the directive and for the loss suffered
by the plaintiff. In other words, it is suggested that the
Francovich principle gives a right to damages for breach of a
directive by a public authority in a specific case, even if the
national legislature has correctly implemented the directive. If
this portrayal is correct, then a claim for damages could be
made against any state authority or body against which the di-
rective could be pleaded for any other purpose, even if the au-
thority lacked the legislative power to implement the direc-
tive.'as1
A directive can be implemented by legislative, executive,
or administrative measures, provided that legal rights are cre-
ated as a result.1 8 4 If a state can also be sued for not taking the
legislative or other measures needed to implement a directive,
the public authorities in a state can be sued if they fail to carry
out the directive in a specific case. If the directive has been
implemented and the national law gives a right to sue for fail-
ure to respect the national measures, the question of whether
Community law would also give a right to damages is not likely
to arise. But if the directive has not been implemented, or if
183. See Foster, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. 3313, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833,
aff'd, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
184. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing implementation of
a directive).
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national law gives no right to damages (and no other appropri-
ate remedy), then it seems that Community law gives a remedy.
The question also arises when the failure by national au-
thorities is a failure to enforce the national measures implement-
ing the directive against private parties, and not otherwise a
breach by them of their obligations under the directive itself.
National authorities have obligations under Article 5 to en-
force Community measures, 85 or national measures needed to
give effect to Community directives. They must do this in an
effective way, and they must do it as vigilantly as they apply
their corresponding national legislation. Where the rights of
those whom the directive is intended to protect are to be safe-
guarded primarily by the vigilance of public authorities rather
than by their own private vigilance, Article 5 may give a right
to sue for compensation if the authorities' supervision fails and
loss results. 8 6 In such a case, the crucial issue for a plaintiff
would be whether it had a right to be protected by an effective
degree of enforcement by the national authority in question, as
distinct from being protected by the directive and the imple-
menting measures themselves. This might be important in the
case of directives intended, for example, to ensure the financial
soundness of banks, insurance companies, or pension funds.
In Francovich, the plaintiff had clearly suffered financial
loss, for which an appropriate amount of compensation would
be an adequate remedy. 8 7 But what kinds of loss (dommage, in
French) are enough to give rise to claims under Francovich?
The High Court in England has held in Twyford Parish Council v.
Secretary of State for the Environment,' 8 that a private party who
had not "suffered" as a result of a breach of a directive could
not rely on the breach against the state. 8 9 Still, that ruling was
before the Francovich judgment; the injury claimed was merely
that the proper procedures for obtaining an environmental im-
185. As to the duty of national authorities to apply EC law, see Germany v.
Commission, Case C-8/88, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 409, 13, 20, (Eur. Ct. J. June 12,
1990).
186. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
187. See Francovich, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 35-37 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov.
19, 1991) (not yet reported).
188. Twyford Parish Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 276 (Q.B. 1990) (U.K.).
189. Id.
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pact assessment under Directive 85/337190 were not followed,
and no prejudice was alleged. The High Court considered that
the directive had not in fact been infringed: it merely stated
that if the proper procedure had been followed, a proper envi-
ronmental impact statement and a non-technical summary of it
would have saved the plaintiffs some time, trouble, and money.
However, the High Court stated that this assertion was "specu-
lative."' 9 ' The case law of the Court on state aid is relevant on
this point: without a doubt identifiable loss is necessary for
compensation to be awarded, but private parties may defend
their rights by appropriate proceedings even before they have
suffered loss, and, in such proceedings, they are entitled to in-
sist that Community law be fully obeyed.
There are other issues that arise under the Francovich prin-
ciple that must be answered ultimately by Community law, not
national law. For example, what is the amount of damages
which should be paid by a state authority for loss due to non-
implementation of a directive? Does Community law give a
right to interest? For many reasons, in practice there may be a
considerable time between the loss being incurred and the
payment of compensation, and the Community law remedy
would be inadequate if there is no right to interest. It is the
duty of the national courts under Article 5 to provide either a
prompt award of compensation or interest.' 92 It would be
most undesirable for Member States to be able to save them-
selves money by delaying payment of compensation for as long
as possible, which could be the result if Community law did not
give a right to receive interest.
Can consequential loss be recovered? There will certainly
be cases in which plaintiffs have made plans on the basis of
directives and found that they could not carry them out, or that
they could carry them out only with a lower rate of profit, be-
cause the directives have not been implemented. Directives
give a variety of rights in a wide variety of circumstances: all
those rights are protected if the three Francovich conditions are
fulfilled, and there is no obvious reason to exclude any kind of
consequential loss from the protection of the Francovich princi-
190. Council Directive No. 85/337, O.J. L 175/40 (1985).
191. Twyford, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 276.
192. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
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pie. No doubt when the issue arises the Court will look at the
national laws on consequential loss in the different Member
States.
Is the state liability absolute? It seems unlikely that a state
could plead, in the case of inadequate or incorrect implemen-
tation of a directive, that it had interpreted the directive rea-
sonably or that it had acted on the Commission's interpreta-
tion, since the duty to implement directives is an absolute one
to which negligence issues are irrelevant. Since a directive's
correct interpretation can be relied upon against the state in all
other kinds of litigation in national courts,1 93 it seems unlikely
that it could not be relied on in claims for damages for incor-
rect or inadequate implementation. National measures that
are said to meet the requirements of-a directive must be inter-
preted, if possible, in accordance with the directive, even if
they were enacted before the directive and were, therefore, not
written with the directive in mind.9 4 Therefore, it seems that
the question of whether the state had implemented a directive
is an objective one in which the subjective intention or attitude
of the state is irrelevant. Also, in cases such as Foster, although
the defendant company is not responsible for the state's failure
to implement the directive being relied on by the plaintiff, it is
liable anyway.'9 5 It could be said that the defendant company
could have voluntarily implemented the directive as far as its
own activities were concerned, but making it liable for its fail-
ure to do so comes close to saying that it has an absolute liabil-
ity, irrespective of negligence.
Private parties have no right to sue a Member State di-
rectly in the Court of Justice for breach of Community law, or
to sue the Commission to force it to sue a Member State. 96
Recently, however, this difficulty has been greatly reduced in
193. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 5, 169-7 1; Slaughtered Cows, Case
39/72, [1973] E.C.R. 101, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439.
194. Smith, The Francovich Case: State Liability and the Individual's Right to Damages,
3 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 129-32 (1992) raises other issues. Would a de minimis
rule apply? The obvious answer is, if identifiable loss has occurred, compensation
should be paid. Are damages available as well as other remedies? The answer is, if
another remedy is given insofar as loss is thereby prevented, no damages can be
claimed.
195. See Foster, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. 3313, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833,
aff'd, [19911 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
196. See, e.g., Emrich v. Commission, Case C-247/90, [1990] E.C.R. 3913.
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importance. Provided that the Community law rule is one
which creates private rights, those who are entitled to those
rights may sue the state in national courts for whatever remedy
is most appropriate to protect those rights, if they have already
suffered loss, or any other appropriate remedy that they have
standing to claim. If the relevant Community law rule is not
one which gives private rights, potential plaintiffs can hardly
claim to have a legitimate grievance under current Community
law.
C. Interpretation of National Measures Implementing a Directive
It has already been mentioned that national courts are
bound by Community law to interpret national measures im-
plementing a directive as far as possible so as to give effect to
the directive.' 97 As a result of the Francovich judgment, a na-
tional court in such a situation has an additional argument to
take into account.' 98 If the court decides that the national
measure (which it interprets, while the Court in Luxembourg is
the ultimate interpreter of the directive) cannot be interpreted
so as to give effect to the directive in some respect, it may
thereby make its own state liable to pay compensation to any
private party who suffers loss as a result. 99 This should influ-
ence not only the courts themselves. It means that national
governments may have an interest in being represented in liti-
gation between private parties over the interpretation of na-
tional measures implementing directives, to persuade the na-
tional court to interpret the national legislation in such a way
197. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of na-
tional measures to give effect to directives).
198. See Francovich, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 35-37 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov.
19, 1991) (not yet reported).
199. Id. 48. The Court of Justice answered the questions posed to it as fol-
lows:
1) The provisions of directive No. 80/987/EEC of the Council, dated Octo-
ber 20, 1980, concerning the harmonization of the legislations of the Mem-
ber States relative to the protection of salaried workers in the event of the
insolvency of the employer that define the workers' rights, must be inter-
preted to mean that the parties cannot enforce these rights against the State
before the national jurisdictions in the absence of application measures im-
plemented within the required time limits;
2) A Member State is obliged to pay restitution for damages arising for indi-
viduals out of the non-transposition of directive No. 80/987/EEC.
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that the directive is fully implemented and the state is not lia-
ble for defective implementation.2 0 0 National courts should
perhaps notify governments when asked to make rulings that
would mean that the Member State in question is in breach of
Community law, just as some courts notify the government if
the compatibility of legislation with the national constitution is
questioned. In some situations it might be appropriate to sue
the state and the private defendants at the same time.
V. OTHER LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO
IMPLEMENT DIRECTIVES
A. Obstruction of Community Law Rights
As already mentioned, national law procedural rules gen-
erally apply to claims for the protection of rights given by
Community law, provided that these national laws are no less
favorable than those that apply to national law rights, and that
they do not make it practically impossible to exercise Commu-
nity law rights.
In Emmott v. Minister for Social Welfare, the Irish authorities
had failed to implement a directive.20 ' In general, Member
States must adopt whatever measures are needed to give full,
clear, and precise effect to directives so that when the direc-
tives give rights to individuals and companies, the individuals
and companies know their rights fully and may claim them, if
necessary, in national courts. But, as the Court stated in Em-
mott, private parties cannot fully know their rights prior to a
directive's implementation, even if the Court has ruled that the
Member State has failed to fulfill its duty to implement that
particular directive and even if some of the provisions of the
directive are unconditional and precise enough to be relied on
against the state in a national court.2 °2 Only measures giving
correct effect to a directive can put an end to this uncertainty.
Until such measures have been enacted (no matter how long it
takes), the state cannot rely on any rule of national law that
prevents a plaintiff, who has delayed in making a claim, from
succeeding in its action against the state.203
200. Id.
201. [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 894.
202. See id.
203. See id.
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This result could be based on the simple unfairness of a
state relying on one rule of national law against a private plain-
tiff when it has failed to adopt the national measures needed to
establish the rights which the plaintiff claims. But it seems that
the Court regarded the case as an example of the principle that
a state must not take advantage of its own failure to implement
a directive or make it impossible in practice to claim a Commu-
nity law right in national courts. 20 4 The latter principle is well
established in connection with rights under directly applicable
rules of Community law, 20 5 and it now applies to rights under
directives. A fortiori, a Member State cannot rely on its own
unlawful act to defeat a claim under a directive.20 6
Any effort by a Member State to limit or to avoid liability
under the Francovich principle may therefore, in itself, be con-
trary to Community law, and thus ineffective.2 0 7 It was noted
above that the Court did not accept the Advocate General's
suggestion to make the Francovich principle apply with effect
only from the date of the judgment.20 8 The combined effect of
this decision by the Court (which is not mentioned in the judg-
ment) and the Emmott case gives private parties a large number
of claims in respect of facts that have already occurred. There-
fore, the ability of private parties to obtain compensation from
Member States and state bodies will become more important
than it has been in the- past. Unfortunately, it is not equally
easy in all Member States to obtain compensation, or indeed to
obtain other remedies against the state. In some Member
States, court proceedings are too slow and, therefore, may not
provide satisfactory or efficient remedies.
204. Francovich, slip op. 31; Costa v. ENEL (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica),
Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425; NV Algemene Transport-en Ex-
peditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belast-
ingen, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 129.
205. See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 104/86, [1988] E.C.R. 1799, [1989] 3
C.M.L.R. 25 (stating national legislation may not impose a burden of proof on plain-
tiffs to show by documentary evidence that they have not passed on to their custom-
ers taxes improperly levied; duty to repeal legislation incompatible with Community
law in order to eliminate uncertainty about Community law rights); San Giorgio,
[1983] E.C.R. 3595, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 658; Rewe, Case 33/76 [1976] E.C.R. 1989,
[1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533.
206. Cotter and McDermott v. Minister for Social Welfare, Case C-377/89,
[1991] E.C.R. 1178, 21, 26, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 507.
207. Francovich, slip op. 37.
208. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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B. The Francovich Principle and Treaties
The European Community exercises considerable treaty-
making powers. 20 9 Treaties made by the Community in ac-
cordance with Article 228 of the EEC Treaty bind Member
States.2 10 A treaty made by the Community may be imple-
mented by a Community measure such as a regulation or a di-
rective. If this is done, the obligations of Member States and
the duties of national courts are primarily governed by the
Community measures. However, some treaties made by the
Community are not implemented by any Community meas-
ures, and then the Member States must act to give effect to the
treaties. Because treaties made by the Community are part of
Community law,2 t ' it seems that private parties could sue a
Member State if the Member State failed to implement such a
treaty, i.e., if the Francovich conditions were fulfilled. The
question would be likely to arise only if the relevant provisions
of the treaty were not directly applicable, 2 but were intended
to give rise to rights to private parties. If relevant provisions
were directly applicable, no national implementing legislation,
other than consequential repeals, would be needed. If relevant
provisions were not directly applicable, the Francovich require-
ments would not be met. These questions may be important
under the European Economic Area Agreement signed in
1992,213 between the Community and the states that are mem-
bers to the European Free Trade Area ("EFTA"): Austria,
Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzer-
land. 1 4 In essence, this agreement applies a body of law, cor-
209. On the treaty-making powers of the Community, see EEC Treaty, supra note
1, art. 228; Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund
For Inland Waterway Vessels, 1977 ECR 741; DAVID O'KEEFE & HENRY G.
SCHERMERS, MIXED AGREEMENTS (1983); see also the series Agreements and Other
Bilateral Commitments Linking the Communities with Non-Member Countries, and
the series Multilateral Conventions and Agreement (updated annually by the EC
Commission).
210. See O'KEEFE & SCHERMERS, supra note 209.
211. Haegeman v. Belgium, Case 181/73, [1974] E.C.R. 449, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R.
515.
212. S.Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretans Van Justitie, Case C- 192/89, [1990] E.C.R.
3461, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 57; Demirel v. Stadt Schwaibsh Gmiund, Case 12/86, [1987]
E.C.R. 3719, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 421; Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg, Case
104/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3641, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.
213. European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) (currently in draft form only).
214. Id.
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responding to Community law, to the EFTA States, and gives
private companies and individuals in all the nineteen countries
substantially the same rights as they have under Community
law. 215 Thus, at a stroke, a very large body of rights is created.
Francovich has reduced substantially what had been re-
garded as a difference between directly applicable rules and
not-directly applicable rules. It has also significantly increased
the difference between Community directives and normal trea-
ties to which Member States are parties.2 16 In most Member
States, treaties cannot be effectively relied upon by private par-
ties against the state until they are implemented and not
merely ratified. Directives, on the other hand, now represent
commitments which are fully enforceable in national courts
against the Member State concerned. 7
C. Claims Against Private Parties Under the Francovich Principle
As already mentioned, a directive cannot be relied upon
against private parties: only the national measure can be relied
upon to implement the directive. Still, directly applicable
Community rules can be relied upon against private parties,
and Francovich indirectly confirms that directly applicable Com-
munity law gives rights which national courts must enforce for
breach of, among other things, Community antitrust law by
215. See id.
216. See Francovich, Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 7 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19,
1991) (not yet reported).
217. See PIERRE PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW
PHENOMENON IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 104 (Christopher Dwyer trans., 1974). Judge Pescatore writes
that
[t]he Member States must ... expect ... a challenge to their responsibility
before the domestic courts; but beyond these courts they will, through the
medium of references for preliminary rulings, find themselves before the
Community Court, which through the intermediary of the national judge
determines in the last analysis the nature, scope and the content of the obli-
gations imposed on the States.... Hitherto the Member States could yield
to the temptation to take the liberties with Community law which a State can
all too easily allow itself in relation to the requirements of international law;
hitherto they could consider that such liberties would, at the most, involve
external repercussions. Within their internal order, on the other hand, they
could rely on complete impunity. In the Community system, they will now
be taken in the rear, and will be required to answer for their behaviour
before their own courts.
EC MEMBER STATE LIABILITY
awarding appropriate remedies against private parties.21 8
Some national courts have already awarded damages or
granted injunctions in such cases.2 ' 9 The same principles
would apply to other directly applicable rules, but few of them
impose duties on private parties which would give rise to cor-
responding private rights.
D. The Francovich Judgment in a Constitutional Setting
The Court has several times stated that it is dealing with a
constitution. In a case about standing to challenge the lawful-
ness of an act of the European Parliament,220 the Court stated:
[i]t must ... be emphasized in this regard that the European
Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of
law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institu-
tions can avoid a review of the question whether the meas-
ures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic con-
stitutional charter, the Treaty. In particular, in Articles 173
and 184, on the one hand, and in Article 177, on the other,
the Treaty established a complete system of legal remedies
and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to
review the legality of measures adopted by the institu-
tions. 22
In its first opinion on the proposed European Economic Area
Agreement (the "EEA Agreement"), the Court stated that
"[t]he EEC Treaty, although concluded in the form of an inter-
national agreement, nonetheless constitutes the constitutional
charter of a Community based on law." '1222
In the Francovich case, the Court had to decide whether the
omission by a Member State to carry out its obligations under
218. Francovich, slip op. $ 37.
219. See John Temple Lang, EEC Competition Actions in Member States' Courts-
Claims for Damages, Declarations and Injunctions for Breach of Community Antitrust Law, in
1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 219 (Barry Hawk ed., 1984). Picard, Remedies in Na-
tional Law for Breach of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty: A Review, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF
EUR. INTEGRATION 1-37 (1985). The Francovich judgment has shown that the distinc-
tion between private law rights and public law rights, discussed in Bourgoin v. Minister
for Agriculture, supra notes 137-42, is irrelevant for this purpose.
220. Les Verts v. Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, 1365, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 343, 371.
221. Id.
222. See Francovich, slip op. 21; see John Temple Lang, The Direct Effects of
European Community on Individuals and Companies, The Sixth Lord Fletcher Lec-
ture, at 54 n.38 (Law Society London 1984).
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the Treaty gave rise to any legal remedy.22 The Court must
have been aware of the constitutional significance of what it
was deciding, in particular because of the division of powers
between the Community and its Member States.
The European Community has relatively few exclusive
powers;224 most of its powers are concurrent with powers of
Member States.225 This situation exists primarily because
many of its powers are concerned with getting rid of protec-
tionist features of national rules and with harmonization of na-
tional legislation. Neither of these tasks necessitate exclusive
Community powers. The Community has exclusive powers
only in certain areas such as commercial policy (primarily, but
not exclusively external visible trade), and conservation of
marine biological resources. In addition, since Community law
always prevails over national law, every Community measure
creates an area of what is, in effect, exclusive Community
power, since only the Community can alter the Community
measures.
226
But the great majority of all the powers of the Community
227are concurrent powers.  So many powers are concurrent that
there is a far greater likelihood of interference by national
measures with the operation of Community measures than ex-
ists in conventional federations. Every directive is a Commu-
nity measure, adopted in the area of concurrent powers, be-
cause each directive needs to be implemented by national
measures that the state remains free to amend, provided that
the result remains consistent with the directive.228
It is largely in areas of concurrent powers that state meas-
ures interfering with Community measures have given rise to
the Court's rich case law on the reciprocal duties of national
authorities and Community institutions to cooperate with one
223. Opinion 1/91, dated Dec. 14, 1991, 21.
224. See, e.g., Bulk Oil (Zug) AG v. Sun Int'l, Case 174/84, [1986] E.C.R. 559,
[1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 732; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 804/79, [1981] E.C.R.
1045, 1072-76.
225. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
226. John Temple Lang, "European Community Constitutional Law: The Divi-
sion of Powers between the Community and Member States" (The 1988 Lord
MacDermott Lecture), 39 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 209, 217 (1988).
227. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 5, 169-71.
228. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189.
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another.229 This case law is much more elaborate and far
reaching than that on, for example, the apparently similar pro-
vision in the German federal constitution.2 30 The problem of
concurrent powers has also given rise to the need to say what
legal results follow when this cooperation fails.
Essentially, the Court in Francovich has stated that even
when this cooperation fails, there is a legal remedy, and not
simply a political problem, and that the rights of individuals
are as fully protected as legal remedies can protect them.23 1
The Court was most concerned with the legal protection of in-
dividuals' rights,232 but the Francovich judgment also will have
the effect of improving the implementation of Community law.
Because so much Community law consists of either directives
or Community measures which, although directly applicable,
need to be acted on or applied by national authorities, the pos-
sibility of claims for damages for failure to implement Commu-
nity measures will undoubtedly contribute, in due course, to
more efficient implementation by state authorities. The Com-
munity relies very heavily-much more heavily than in most
federations-on Community law being applied by national au-
thorities. So it is extremely important that there are effective
legal remedies against national authorities if they do not do
everything they should do.
The Francovich judgment is a salutary safeguard against
Member States trying to postpone fulfillment of their obliga-
tions under Community law, or misusing their powers in order
to try to find ways of avoiding carrying out their obligations.
There does not seem to be any measure corresponding to
Community directives in any federation. Directives have fea-
tures which are closer to international agreements than to fed-
eral legislation. It is, therefore, not surprising that the issue
that arose in Francovich does not seem to have arisen, at least in
the same form, in other federations. Community law has had
to solve questions arising from directives which do not seem to
have come up elsewhere. Therefore, from the viewpoint of
229. John Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 645-81 (1990).
230. Id.
231. Francovich,Jtined Cases C-6 & 9/90, slip op. 35-36 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19,
1991) (not yet reported).
232. See id.
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comparative constitutional law, Francovich is an historic judg-
ment.
It will be seen that the Francovich judgment uses the tech-
nique that the Court has used to solve many of the constitu-
tional problems of the Community, which is to rule that the
courts of Member States are obliged to enforce Community
law, in spite of the action or inaction of national parliaments
and governments, and when necessary, in spite of conflicting
national law.233 The Court has, therefore, mobilized national
courts to support Community law. In particular, when na-
tional authorities infringe upon Community law, this reduces
the unpopularity that the Court might otherwise arouse, be-
cause, whenever possible, the appropriate findings are made
by national courts rather than by the Court in Luxembourg.
The result is that the Community is much more integrated le-
gally than it is politically.
By relying on national courts, the Court has given rights
to private parties even where Community law is intended to be
carried out through national measures. The result is that pri-
vate rights are not wholly dependent on national implementa-
tion. The Francovich judgment has, therefore, answered the
question "How does the Court of Justice enforce its judg-
ments?" The answer: "By relying on national courts to apply,
when necessary, Community law against national authorities,
and when appropriate, to award compensation."
The solidarity that the Court has established with national
judges is extremely important, because Community law re-
quires judicial review by all national courts of the compatibility
of national measures with Community law. The Francovich
judgment has closed what might have been a serious gap in
Community law.
The experience of the Community has shown that eco-
nomic integration needs an independent body, such as the
Commission, to formulate policy in the interests of all Member
States, and to enforce the Treaty against states when neces-
sary. Clearly, the Court also considers that active enforcement
by national courts is also essential to make economic measures
effective. This is certainly so in the European Community,
where the powers of states are still very great, and where the
233. Id. at 40-42.
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application of Community law is still largely in the hands of
national authorities. With such a constitutional framework, it
is natural that the Court should rely on the national courts,
which are the national authorities best suited to interpret and
apply Community law, and best equipped to oblige other na-
tional authorities to obey it. The result is a new kind of polit-
ical construction, a kind of confederation in which the state au-
thorities enforce and apply the law of the confederation, and
award compensation, even against their own state.
The constitutional law of the Community is now intercon-
nected with the constitutional law of Member States. The gov-
ernments of the states vote in the main Community legislative
institution, the Council. Community measures have various ef-
fects in national law without any action by national legislatures.
In the EC sphere, there are no longer any dualist states. In the
area of exclusive Community powers, the national authorities
can no longer exercise powers their constitutions formerly
gave them. Community law has increased the powers of na-
tional courts in many Member States, because Member States
must now declare inapplicable all national rules which are in-
compatible with Community law, and since Francovich, award
compensation against their own state authorities if the authori-
ties fail to comply with Community law.
Community law has created, in effect, two procedures for
judicial review by the Court on the compatibility of national
legislation with Community law, under Articles 169-170 and
177 of the EEC Treaty, respectively. In the EC law sphere,
both Community measures and national measures must com-
ply with principles of fundamental rights drawn from, among
other sources, the European Convention on Human Rights.
So, in the Community, the powers of every Member State are
limited, whatever its national constitutional law may say, and
national courts have wide duties to act accordingly. For Mem-
ber States that already had a written constitution, limited gov-
ernment, and judicial review for compatibility with their consti-
tutions, this does not represent a very great change. It is a
much more substantial change in a Member State like the
United Kingdom, a Member State with no written constitution,
no judicial review for constitutionality, and (in theory, at least)
unlimited parliamentary sovereignty.
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VI. FRANCOVICH AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
AREA
The agreement setting up the European Economic Area
requires the EFTA States to introduce into their national laws
a very large proportion of the whole body of the Community
law, with the exception of the Common Agricultural Policy and
some other legislation not relevant here. As the "acquis com-
munautaire" to be introduced into the EFTA States includes the
case law of the Court, and as the EEA Agreement includes an
article which corresponds to Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, 34 the
Francovich principle will be part of the laws of the EFTA States
from the date on which the EEA Agreement comes into force.
This means that the EFTA States need to implement all the
directives which are referred to in the EEA Agreement by that
date (unless the parties have agreed to specific transitional pe-
riods), or run the risk of being sued for damages for any loss
that may be caused as a result.
234. Article 3 of the EEA Agreement; see Finnish Association for European Law,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE EEC-NORDIC
REGION (Sundstrom ed., 1992); Irish Centre for European Law, CREATING A EURO-
PEAN ECONOMIC SPACE: LEGAL ASPECTS OF EC-EFTA RELATIONS (Robinson & Find-
later eds., 1990); EC-EFTA: -MORE THAN GOOD FRIENDS? Uamar & Wallace eds.,
1988).
